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INTRODUCTION
The common law rule against contribution' among joint tort-
feasors2 is based upon the proposition that courts should not offer
relief to wrongdoers.' Accordingly, courts have refused to apportion
damages among tort-feasors in situations involving common liabil-
ity or fault, and distribution of liability for damages under the
rule is consequently controlled, de facto, by the plaintiff through
the execution of his judgment.' The resultant distribution is usually
1. The origin of the common law rule is Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep.
1337 (K.B. 1799). The "rule" of Merryweather prohibited contribution among intentional
tort-feasors who acted in concert. Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for
Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REv. 176, 177-78 (1898). The rule was subse-
quently extended by American courts to include unintentional tort-feasors who acted concur-
rently to produce a single injury. See Contribution Between Negligent Tort-Feasors at Com-
mon Law, 60 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1958). See also HARPER & JAMES, 1 LAW OF TORTS § 10.2 (1956);
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 50 (4th ed. 1971); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932). Unless otherwise indicated the rule against contri-
bution discussed herein includes unintentional tort-feasors.
2. Considerable confusion results from the imprecise use of the term "joint tort-feasors."
It "is one of those unhappy phrases of indeterminate meaning whose repetition has done so
much to befog the law." Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413
(1937). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines a joint tort as a situation in
which "two or more persons owe to another the same duty and by their common neglect such
other is injured." For present purposes a broad definition of joint tort-feasor is used: one of
two or more persons who unite in committing a tort (jointly committed tort) ur who through
acts or omissions combine to produce a single indivisible injury to a third person (concur-
rently committed tort).
3. Other traditional rationales used to justify the existence of this rule in American juris-
dictions include such policy considerations as the following: A court will not aid one who
comes before it with unclean hands, Wanack v. Michels, 205 Il1. 87, 74 N.E.84 (1905); the
risk of one wrong-doer bearing all the consequences will have a prophylactic effect, Peck v.
Ellis, 2 Johns, Ch. 131, (N.Y. 1816); the courts will waste time and energy at the expense of
honest litigants if it considered apportioning damages, Avery v. Bank, 221 Mo. 71, 119 S.W.
1106 (1909).
4. A plaintiff may sue and execute a judgment he obtains as he pleases. Thus, where tort-
feasors are jointly and severally liable, the ultimate result may be that one defendant tort-
feasor may pay for the total losses while the other goes scott free. The laissez faire attitude
of courts toward the distribution of monetary liability in the execution of judgment means
that the ingenuity of defendants' attorney will likely influence plaintiffs decision regarding
how much of the loss each defendant will bear. The possibilities are limited only by a court's
decision to monitor such out-of-court behavior. See Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 55 Ill.
2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973); DOOLEY, 1 MODERN TORT LAW § 26.17. (1977); Duree, Has The
Loan Receipt Agreement Established Reverse Comparative Negligence Or Indemnity Among
Active Tortfeasors In Illinois?, 64 ILL. BAR J. 236 (1975); Michael, "Mary Carter" Agreements
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final, since a tort-feasor who pays a judgment has no action for
contribution against a co-tort feasor.
It is apparent tl.at the rule against contribution can no longer be
justified for the ultimate distribution of losses has little to do with
the relative fault of the tort-feasors.5 Further, the discharge of judg-
ment by one tort-feasor without proportionate payment from his co-
tort-feasors gives the latter an advantage to which he is not equita-
bly entitled. The inequities created by private control over the allo-
cation of losses among joint tort-feasors have led to legislative or
judicial repeal of the rule in most jurisdictions.' Today few states
in Illinois, 64 ILL. BAR J. 514 (1976); Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tort-
feasors, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 728 (1968).
5. It is unfortunate that this harsh result follows from a mere maxim of commonn law:
"The plaintiff is Lord of his action." Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Commis-
sioner's Prefatory Note 1939 Act, 9 U.L.A. 230-32 (1957 ed.).
6. Forty American jurisdictions have abandoned the common law rule against contribu-
tion by various means. Eighteen states have passed statutes based on either the 1939 or 1955
version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 U.L.A. 57 (1978 Supp., 1975
ed.) [Dates given indicate year of approval]: Alaska, Alaska Stat. §§ 09.16.010-.060 (1970);
Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-100-1009 (1941); Delaware, DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 6301-6308
(1949); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31 (West 1975); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-11-17
(1941); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1941); Massachusetts, MASs. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231 B §§ 1-4 (1962); Mississippi, MIss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1952); Nevada, NEV.
REV. STAT. § 17.215-.325 (1973); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-1-53A-5 (1952); New
Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-11 to-18 (1947); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-B-1
to-6 (1968); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-01-04 (1957); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2082-2089 (1951); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-6-1 to -11 (1940); South
Dakota, S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-11 to 22 (1945); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-
3101 to 3106 (1968); Wyoming, W.S. §§ 1-1-110-113 (1978). Other jurisdictions have enacted
legislation which abandons the common law rule: California, CAL. CIv. PRoc. § 875 (Deering
1978); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2011 to 2012 (1977); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 6-803 (1)
(1977); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a) (1974); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. § 412030
(1973); Louisiana, LA. Civ. PRAC. ANN. Arts. 1111-1116 (1977); Michigan, MIcH. STAT. ANN. §
600.2925(a) (1974); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (1977); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.060 (1977); Montana, MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 58-6072 (1977); New Hampshire, N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7b (1971); New York, N.Y. Ctv. PRAC. § 1401 (McKinney 1974); Texas,
TEX. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2212a § 2(b) (1973); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39 (1973);
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1036 (1970); Virginia, VA. CODE § 8.01-34 (1977); West
Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-13 (1958); Wisconsin, Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 113.01-.10 (1973);
Several jurisdictions abolished the rule by judicial decision, and some subsequently enacted
legislation: California, Augustus v. Bean, 56 Cal. 2d 270, 363 P.2d 873 (1961); District of
Columbia, George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942), Knell
v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Florida, Licenberg v. Issen, Fla. 318 So. 2d 386
(1975); Iowa, Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Louisiana, Quatray v.
Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933); Maine, Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24
(1963); Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 A. 815 (1918); Massachusetts, Jacobs v. Pollard,
64 Mass. 287 (1852); Minnesota, Duluth M.& N.R.R. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N.W.
766 (1931); Underwriters at Lloyds of Minneapolis v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13
(1926); Oregon, Furbeck v. Gevurtz & Son, 72 Ore. 12, 143 P. 654 (1914); Pennsylvania,
Goldman v. Mitchell Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A.231 (1928); Wisconsin, Mitchell v.
Raymond 181 Wis. 591, 195 N.W. 855 (1923); Ellis v. Chicago & N.W.Ry. Co., 167 Wis. 392,
167 N.W. 1048 (1918). These jurisdictional lists are adapted from: Uniform Contribution
Contribution in Illinois
retain an absolute bar to contribution.7
A substantive right to contribution is a legal reform which has
been advocated by lawyers and judges in Illinois for sometime.' The
final vestige of the common law rule against contribution was elimi-
nated by the Illinois Supreme Court in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice
Division Package Machinery Co." The court stated that "there is no
valid reason for the continued existence of the no-contribution rule
and many compelling arguments against it." ° Although Skinner
unequivocally rejects the rule against contribution, the decision
raises questions concerning the scope and substance of contribution
in Illinois. The supreme court, in two cases decided with Skinner,
indicates that it may follow a very restrictive interpretation of the
Skinner holding," but offers no procedural guidelines for the prac-
tice of contribution in the future.
This article will briefly trace the development of the law in Illinois
prior to the Skinner decision. The Skinner case will be critically
analysized, with particular emphasis on the arguments raised by the
dissent. Finally, the ramifications of the Skinner decision on third-
party practice in Illinois will be explored.
Historical Perspective
The rule against contribution among joint tort-feasors has been
considered a well-established principle of Illinois law. While the rule
Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 U.L.A.57 (1955 & Supp. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
Notes to Institute § 886 A (1970); FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, 2 B PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS, DEFEN-
SES, DAMAGES, CONTRIBUTIONS § 103 (1) (1970) [hereinafter cited as PERSONAL INJURY].
7. Ten jurisdictions still retain the common law prohibition in some form: Alabama,
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Wash-
ington. PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 6.
8. The Illinois Judicial Conference of 1964 and 1976 adopted resolutions favoring contri-
bution among joint tort-feasors; However the legislature did not act upon these recommenda-
tions. See Study Committee Report on Indemnity, Third Party Actions and Equitable Contri-
butions, reprinted in 1976 Report of the Illinois Judicial Conference [hereinafter cited as
Commitee Report]; Report Committee on Comparitive Negligence, reprinted in 1964 Report
of the Illinois Judicial Conference. But see Polelle, Contribution Among Negligent Joint
Tortfeasors in Illinois: A Squeamish Damsel Comes of Age, 1 Loy. Cm. L.J. 267 (1970),
suggesting that an historical study of Illinois case law indicates contribution among negligent
tort-feasors is not prohibited.
9. No. 48757 (11., Dec. 12, 1977).
10. No. 48757, slip op. at 7 (Il. Dec. 12, 1977).
11. "In [Skinner], upon consideration of contentions similiar to those made here, we
concluded that on the facts there alleged and for purposes of the motion admitted, there was
no sound reason for the application of the no-contribution rule," Stevens v. Silver Manufac-
turing Co., No. 48974, slip op. at 2 (Ill., Dec. 13, 1977). "In [Skinner], this court held that,
as between the manufacturer and a purchaser-employer, a manufacturer is entitled to main-
tain an action for contribution on a theory of comparative liability where it is alleged that
the employer's misuse of the product and/or assumption of risk contributed to the employee's
injury." Robinson v. International Harvester Co., No. 49205, slip op. at 2 (11. Dec. 13, 1977).
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was recognized, however, Illinois courts fashioned various methods
of distributing losses among joint tort-feasors to prevent injustice.
First, courts expanded the concept of implied indemnity" to enable
a tort-feasor who had been guilty of passive negligence to maintain
an action for indemnity against a joint tort-feasor who had been
actively negligent. 3 A qualitative discrepancy between the fault of
the parties was a prerequisite for the application of this active-
passive negligence doctrine. When effectuated, a passively negligent
defendant obtained indemnity from an actively negligent defendant
for the total amount of the plaintiff's judgment.
Secondly, courts avoided the impact of the rule against contribu-
tion by refining the definition of joint tort-feasor, for once it was
determined that the parties were joint tort-feasors, the rule auto-
matically barred contribution among them. At common law, courts
considered the intent of the tort-feasors and unity of purpose or
concerted action the test for jointness." Determination of concerted
action was critical since common law procedural rules did not pro-
vide for joinder of parties unless there was such action.'5 In the
absence of such action, parties were not considered joint tort-feasors
and could not be joined even if the injury produced was indivisible.
Under modern procedural rules, with liberal joinder provisions, con-
current wrongdoers became confused with joint tort-feasors, 6 and
defendants whose negligence concurred to produce a single result
were considered joint tort-feasors. Careless usage of the term joint
tort-feasor increased the number of cases which fell within the scope
of the rule against contribution. In response to this problem, Illinois
courts eventually clarified the definition of joint tort-feasor, indicat-
ing that joint liability of concurrent wrongdoers could result only
where a single and indivisible harm was caused by their actions.
12. The distinction between contribution and indemnity is that contribution distributes
the loss among joint tort-feasors by requiring each to pay his proportionate share, while
indemnity shifts the total loss from one tort-feasor to another PRossER, LAW OF TORTS § 48
(4th ed. 1971) Indemnity arises by express agreement or operation of law. For a discussion of
the development of implied indemnity, vis a vis the rule against contribution, see Bua, Third
Party Practice in Illinois: Express and Implied Indemnity, 25 DEPAuL L. REv. 287 (1976); R.
Michael and N. Appel, Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois, 7
Loy. Cm. L.J. 591 (1976).
13. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R.Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 98
N.E.2d 783 (1951). "The courts have ... had to find a way to do justice within the law so
that one guilty of an act of negligence-affirmative, active, primary in its character-will not
escape scot-free, leaving another whose fault was only technical or passive to assume complete
liability," Id. at 156, 98 N.E.2d at 787. See also Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. Co. v. Evans
Constr. Co., 32 111. 2d 600, 208 N.E.2d 573 (1965).
14. See note 1 supra.
15. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. Rav. 413, 414 n.18 (1937).
16. Id. at 420.
1018 [Vol. 9
1978] Contribution in Illinois 1019
This reform was not a return to the common law test of jointness,
rather the touchstone of'the reformed definition was indivisibility
of result. Thus, parties who acted to cause divisible injuries were not
considered joint tort-feasors in Illinois, and would be permitted to
shift the losses attributable to another tort-feasor's conduct through
partial indemnification.7
Although these alternatives provide relief from the inequities of
the no-contribution rule, they serve as an inadequate replacement
for the right to contribution among tort-feasors. The active-passive
doctrine, for example, precludes relief where justice may dictate
that tort-feasors distribute the burden among themselves." Because
relief is provided through indemnity, the doctrine is necessarily lim-
ited to an all or nothing proposition." Moreover, courts have had
considerable difficulty in consistently applying the elusive concep-
tual distinctions within the doctrine itself. 0 While the second
method, refining the definition of joint tort-feasor, reduced the
number of parties subject to the bar against contribution it tends
to place considerable weight on the nature of the injury.' Under
either alternative, the parties and the courts are forced to pursue a
very cumbersome and circuitous path towards the just distribution
of losses among joint tort-feasors.
17. Gertz v. Campbell, 55 I11. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973). In Gertz, partial indemnifica-
tion was permissible because the injury to plaintiff was divisible, as opposed to indivisible,
and because the tort-feasors did not act concurrently, but independently and successively.
See note 2 supra. By allowing partial indemnification for the injuries attributable to each
tort-feasor, the court, in effect circumvented the rule against contribution.
18. The active-passive doctrine does not apply if the parties are in pari delicto, Sargent
v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 229 N.E.2d 769 (1967); if the indemnitee is
actively negligent, Carver V. Grossman, 55 Ill. 2d 507, 305 N.E.2d 161 (1973): or if the tort-
feasors owed the same duty to the injured party, Harris v. Algonquin Ready Mix, Inc., 59 Ill.
2d 445, 322 N.E.2d 58 (1974).
19. See note 12 supra.
20. The conceptual difficulties are illustrated in the following excerpt from a trial record:
[Juror]: Could I ask one question? Would you clarify a little further this active
and passive, just how that is applied? I mean how it is applied here, active and
passive negligence. I mean the difference.
The Court: The Court hesitates to give you an illustration of that which is passive
and that which is active for fear that you might construe it to be the only evidence
of such a situation...
[Juror]: Does it mean direct and indirect?
The Court: A person, actually this can pretty well be predicated on the proposi-
tion that if one just assumed an indifferent or laissez faire attitude, or something,
that could be an active negligence, but indifference on the other hand, may be
construed so as to make a case of passive negligence as opposed to active negligence.
General Elec. Co. v. Cuban American Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89, 98 n.15 (5th Cir. 1968), quoted
in, DOOLEY, 1 MODERN TORT LAW § 26.07 at 552 n.14 (1977).
21. For a discussion of the historical development of the term "joint tort-feasor" see
Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALJF. L. REv. 413 (1937).
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SKINNER V. REED-PRENTICE DIVISION PACKAGE MACHINERY CO.
Factual Background
Plaintiff, an employee of Hinckley Plastic, Inc., was injured when
a safety device on an industrial machine malfunctioned. The ma-
chine was owned by Hinckley Plastic, Inc., and manufactured by
Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. The molding ma-
chine was being operated by another Hinckley Plastic employee
when a safety gate in front of the molding area became disengaged
from its rails.12 While plaintiff assisted in the attempt to replace the
safety gate, the molding machine closed and injured her right arm.13
Plaintiff filed suit against Package Machinery based on strict tort
liability,24 alleging that the injection molding machine was in an
unreasonably dangerous condition when it left the defendant's con-
trol and that this condition caused her injuries.
The defendant denied plaintiff's allegations and attempted to
implead Hinckley Plastic as a third-party defendant.2 5 In its third-
party complaint against the employer, Package Machinery alleged
that it was not wholly responsible for the condition of the machine.
More than twenty years had elasped since the machine had been
manufactured, and it had been sold and resold as used equipment
three times before Hinckley Plastic acquired it.25 The defendant
manufacturer further alleged that if the machine was in an unrea-
sonably dangerous condition when plaintiff was injured, such condi-
tion was substantially caused by negligent acts or omissions of the
plaintiff's employer and other intermediate owners.27 Package
Machinery, therefore, should not be required to bear the burden of
22. Petition For Leave To Appeal, Package Machinery Company, Third Party Plaintiff-
Petitioner, Appendix C., Complaint At Law (Plaintiff), A13-A14, para. 3 [hereinafter cited
as Petition To Appeal].
23. Id.
24. Id. See also Brief and Argument for Package Machinery Co., Third-Party Plaintiff-
Appellant at 11, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., No. 48757 (Ill.
Dec. 12, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
25. Petition To Appeal, supra note 22, Ammended Third Party Complaint of Package
Machinery Company Against Hinckley Plastic, Inc., Third Party Defendant Appendix C.
A18-A21. [hereinafter cited as Third-Party Complaint]. See note 27 infra.
26. Third-Party Complaint, supra note 25, at A18-A19, para 1 and 2.
27. Petition To Appeal, supra note 22 at 7. Third-Party Complaint, supra note 25, Appen-
dix C., A20-A21, para. 7, 8 and 9. The essence of the third-party complaint is: a) Hinckley
Plastic purchased the used machine, and put it into operation when it was in a state of
disrepair, b) The machine had been modified or rewired so as to cause the safety devices
installed by the manufacturer to become inoperative; c) Hinckley Plastic knowingly allowed
said machine to be operated without safety guards originally furnished and failed to inspect
the machine in operation to determine if it was in a reasonably safe condition; d) Hinckley
Plastic failed to have said machine maintained and repaired by a competent foreman or
employee who had knowledge of Reed-Prentice Injection Molding Machines. Id. para. 8.
1020
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consequences brought about, in part, by the negligence of the em-
ployer." Assuming arguendo that it was guilty of the acts alleged in
plaintiff's complaint, defendant Package Machinery asserted that
plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the combined acts of
defendant and the employer.2 The manufacturer thereby character-
ized itself and the employer as joint tort-feasors.0 The relief sought
by Package Machinery was contribution from Hinckley Plastic on
the basis of relative fault or responsibility."
Hinckley Plastic filed a motion to dismiss the third-party com-
plaint.2 The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but filed an
opinion expressing the view that Illinois should abandon the
"active-passive" 3 doctrine and adopt contribution among joint tort-
feasors.34 The court stated, however, that a definitive ruling on the
third-party complaint could only be obtained from a court of re-
view. 5
The dismissal of the third-party complaint was upheld on appeal.
The issue presented to the appellate court was whether a manufac-
turer, held strictly liable in tort, could obtain contribution from a
negligent employer in proportion to the misconduct attributable to
28. Brief for Appellant, supra note 24, at 29.
29. Petition To Appeal, supra note 22, at 7.
30. The defendant-manufacturer and employer are joint tort-feasors if the definition of
joint tort includes concurrently committed torts. However, if the term is restricted to jointly
committed torts, there must be a common duty violated. See note 2 supra.
31. "(T)hird-party plaintiff prays that if judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff and
against it that judgment be entered against the third-party defendant and in favor of third-
party plaintiff in such amount, by way of ccntribution, as would be commensurate with the
degree of misconduct attributable to the thirdparty defendant in causing plaintiff's injuries."
Third-Party Complaint, supra note 22, A21 para. 9.
32. Brief and Argument for Hinckley Plastic, Inc. Third Party Defendant-Appellee, at 17.
Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., No. 48757 (Il1. Dec. 12, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee] The Appellee does not address the issue of contribu-
tion, but frames its analysis under previous case law. Hinckley's position can be summarized
as follows: (1) Fault-weighing concepts cannot be applied as a basis for indemnity in strict
liability cases; (2) The manufacturer, if liable to the plaintiff, is necessarily an "active"
tortfeasor and cannot recover in indemnity regardless of how Hinckley's negligence is classi-
fied; (3) If Package Machinery were allowed to recover from Hinckley, the plaintiff-employee
would be permitted to do indirectly what she cannot do directly under Workmens' Compensa-
tion laws - sue her employer, Id. para. 1-9.
33. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
34. Petition To Appeal, supra note 22, Appendix B, Opinion and Judgment Order of
Circuit Court, A9-A12.
35. "Although the Court is in sympathy with the third-party plaintiff's position and if it
had the power to do so would adopt the rule laid down by . . .[Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,
30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972)], it is of the view that [such reliefn .. .must come
from the reviewing courts of this state..." Id. at A12. However Dole is distinguishable from
Skinner in that Dole dealt with a manufacturer seeking partial indemnification, rather than
contribution, from an employer of the plaintiff-decedent. Moreover Dole was a suit for negli-
gence not strict tort liability. The Illinois trial court did not allude to these distinctions.
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the employer .3 The appellate court discussed the policy considera-
tions underlying strict liability, 37 and noted that prior Illinois deci-
sions had refused to apply the active-passive negligence doctrine to
a manufacturer held strictly liable .3  Recognizing that the third-
party complaint in Skinner sought contribution" instead of relief
under the active-passive doctrine, the court concluded that "a deci-
sion to apply the theories of contribution in the instant case would
require substantive and procedural formulations beyond the author-
ity of this court."40 Package Machinery was given leave to appeal
the dismissal of its third-party contribution claim to the Illinois
Supreme Court. The threshold issue before the supreme court was
whether the court could properly abolish the rule against contribu-
tion.
The Illinois Supreme Court Decision
Initially, the court considered the employer's argument that the
legislature was the appropriate forum for the adoption of contribu-
tion among joint tort-feasors.4' Although the rule against contribu-
tion is a product of judicial interpretation," the employer contended
that the abolition of the rule effects "a substantial change in the
fabric of tort law in this state . . . best left to the legislature. 4 3 The
court summarily rejected this assertion, and concluded "Where this
court has created a rule or doctrine which, under present conditions,
we consider unsound and unjust, we have not only the power, but
the duty to modify or abolish it.""
36. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 99, 351
N.E.2d 405 (1977).
37. The one who created the risk and reaped the profit by placing the product in the
stream of commerce should bear the losses caused by a defective product. See Peterson v.
Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Il. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975); Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
38. See Liberty Mutual Ins. v. Williams Mach. & Tool, 62 Ill. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857
(1975); Burke v. Sky-Climber, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d 498, 301 N.E. 2d 41, aff'd., 57 Ill. 2d 542,
316 N.E.2d 516 (1974); Kossifos v. Louden Machinery Co., 22 Ill. App. 3d 587, 317 N.E.2d
749 (1974); Stanfield v. Medalist Industries Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 996, 309 N.E.2d 104 (1974).
39. See note 12 supra.
40. 40 Ill. App. 3d 99, 104, 351 N.E.2d 405, 409 (1977). The court noted that the third-
party complaint could have been interpreted as a defense to the plaintiff's original complaint
rather than as a basis for contribution against a third party. An analogous situation arose in
Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 542, 316 N.E.2d 516 (1974). In Burke, a manufacturer
sought indemnity from the owner of a scaffold upon which the decedent plaintiff was injured.
The court held that the third-party complaint alleged a defense to the original action, rather
than a ground for indemnification.
41. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. No. 48757, slip op. at 7
(Dec. 12, 1977) [hereinafter slip op.].
42. See materials cited in note 50 infra.
43. Brief for Appellee, supra note 32, at 53.
44. Slip op., supra note 41, at 7. But see Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445
1022 [Vol, 9
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Having resolved the threshold issue, the court considered the ap-
plication of the principles of contribution to the facts in Skinner.
The court reached three significant conclusions. First, the court
clearly abolished the rule against contribution among unintentional
tort-feasors in Illinois.45 Secondly, a manufacturer, held strictly lia-
ble in tort, may obtain contribution from a co-tort-feasor on the
basis of relative fault or misconduct." Finally, in spite of workmen's
compensation laws, a third party action for contribution against an
employer is available to recover damages paid to an employee.,7
The foremost result of Skinner is the recognition that the rule of
no-contribution in Illinois is no longer justifiable. The court adopted
the philosophy of Dean Prosser that
[t]here is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits
the entire burden of loss, for which two defendants were equally,
unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone ac-
cording to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the exist-
ence of liability insurance, the plaintiff's whim or spite, or his
collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scott
free.4"
In the system of liability based on fault, there is no longer a place
for a principle which ignores relative culpability and places the full
(1968). In Maki, the court was asked to abolish contributory negligence, and adopt compara-
tive negligence. The court was unwilling to promulgate the new rule because of the complexity
of a good comparative negligence system. There the court concluded: "[Sluch a far reaching
change if desirable, should be made by the legislature rather than by the court. The General
Assembly is the department of government to which the constitution has entrusted the power
of changing the law." Id. at 196, 239 N.E.2d at 447. The apparent inconsistency between the
positions in. Maki and Skinner is reconciliable to the extent that the question in Skinner is
analogous to the issue presented in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, 18 Ill. 2d
11, 25, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960) where the court considered
the abolition of the doctrine of the school immunity, and concluded, "We closed our court
room doors without legislative help, and we can like wise open them." Id. at 25, 163, N.E.2d
at 96. In Molitor, the court was asked to abolish an immunity doctrine. Both Skinner and
Molitor are distinguishable from Maki in the sense that the judicial change of law could be
complete and effective. See Leflar, Comments on Maki v. Frelk, 21 VAND. L. REv. 918 (1968).
See also note 111 infra.
45. Slip op., supra note 41, at 7. It is worth noting that there may still be a remnant of
the no-contribution rule. The rule against contribution in its original formulation included
only intentional conduct. American jurisdictions extended the rule to include the "less"
culpable unintentional tort-feasor, see supra note 1. The propriety of the rule against contri-
bution was raised in Skinner with respect to unintentional tort-feasors, Petition To Appeal,
supra note 22, at 6; Brief for Appellant, supra note 22, at 3. It is unclear whether the court,
in repealing the rule, recognized this distinction. See notes 98 through 105 and accompanying
text infra.
46. Slip op., supra note 41, at 9.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 9 quoting PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 50 (4th ed. 1971).
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burden of restitution on one who is only partly responsible.49 In
addition to the fundamental unfairness of no-contribution, the court
found the historical origins of the Illinois rule illusory. 0 Further, the
continuous difficulties of shifting losses under the active-passive
exception cast doubt on the efficacy of the no-contribution rule
itself."
The second major conclusion reached by the Skinner court is that
a manufacturer held strictly liable in tort may obtain relief through
the principles of contribution. The court rejected the contention
that because "the duty imposed in strict liability is more stringent
than in cases involving negligence"52 defendant-manufacturer
should be precluded from seeking contribution. The court held that
the policy considerations underlying strict liability are satisfied
when the economic loss is imposed on the defendant-
manufacturer." Once the manufacturer has discharged its liability
to the plaintiff, the principles of strict liability are not defeated by
an equitable apportionment of the liability by way of contribution
or indemnity. 4
49. The original text of the opinion of the court in Skinner expressly stated "In our system
of liability based on fault there is obvious sense and justice in a rule that extent of fault should
govern the extent of liability among tortfeasors." Slip op., supra note 41, at 7. However, as
of March 1, 1978 the Skinner opinion was modified to delete this sentence. The significance
of this modification may relate to common liability, see discussion in text accompanying
notes 87 through 91 infra.
50. A review of past cases in Illinois indicates that there is no broad prohibition against
contribution among unintentional tort-feasors. The following cases compromise the origins
of the rule: Skala v. Lehon,, 343 Ill. 602, 175 N.E. 832 (1931); John Griffiths & Son Co. v.
National Fireproofing Co., 310 Ill. 331, 141 N.E. 739 (1932); Wanack v. Michels, 215 Ill. 87,
74 N.E. 84 (1905); Consolidated Ice Machine Co. v. Keefer, 134 Il1. 481 (1890); Johnson v.
Chicago and Pacific Elevator Co., 105 Ill. 462 (1882); Nelson v. Cook, 17 Ill. 443 (1856). In
spite of the suspect historical origins of the rule against contribution, recent cases flatly state
that there is no contribution among joint tort-feasors: Carver v. Grossman, 55 Ill.2d 507, 305
N.E.2d 161 (1973); Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39 Il. 2d 226, 234 N.E.2d 790 (1968); Miller v.
DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E. 2d 630 (1967); Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. v. Evans
Constr. Co., 32 Ill. 2d 600, 208 N.E. 2d 573 (1965). As one commentator observed, "A histori-
cal study of case law does not support the supposedly well-settled proposition that contribu-
tion is prohibited between negligent joint tortfeasors in Illinois. The law is considered well-
settled largely because it has become an unquestioned shibboleth." Polelle, Contribution
Among Negligent Joint Tort-feasors in Illinois: A Squeamish Damsel Comes of Age, 1 Loy.
Cm. L.J. 267, 268 (1970).
51. Slip op. supra note 41, at 5-7. See notes 18 through 20 supra and accompanying text.
52. Slip op., supra note 41, at 8.
53. Id. See cases collected in note 37 supra for basic policy behind strict liability.
54. The distinction between "upstream" and "downstream" actions for indemnity within
the chain of distribution was important under past case law in Illinois. Upstream means
against the flow of commerce within the chain, i.e. purchaser-seller-manufacturer. Down-
stream directly correlates to the flow of the goods through commerce. Courts allowed re-
covery through indemnification when the action was upstream. See Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Texaco v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 Ill. App. 2d
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The final issue addressed in Skinner relates to the conflict be-
tween an employer's potential liability for contribution and the
workmen's compensation laws. The court stated that "the obliga-
tion to contribute should extend to all tort-feasors responsible for
the injury."55 Under this rule, the basis for contribution consists of
sufficient proof that the conduct of a co-tort-feasor was a contribut-
ing cause of the injury. From this perspective it is immaterial that
an employee may not have a cause of action in tort against his
employer for negligence because of workmen's compensation laws.57
351, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1969). The ground for indemnification was strict tort liability. The
rationale behind upstream relief was that a party whose liability arose because of a defective
product was entitled to indemnification from those who supplied the product to him. Down-
stream actions for indemnity were consistently denied, see cases collected in note 38 supra.
A party held strictly liable was not permitted relief under the active-passive doctrine be-
cause his liability was construed as active, Stanfield v. Medalist Industries, 17 Ill. App. 3d
996, 309 N.E.2d 104 (1974). See also note 18 supra. Skinner permits a downstream action for
contribution as opposed to indemnity, see note 12 supra. The question of whether an action
for downstream indemnity is permitted after Skinner is unclear. The essential issue is
whether the court should continue to construe liability based upon strict tort as necessarily
constituting "active" conduct. However since there is probably no reason for the continued
use of the active-passive doctrine with the advent of contribution, the issue may be moot,
see discussion in text accompanying notes 92 through 97 infra. Note, the term indemnity
discussed herein does not include actions for breach of warranty.
55. Slip op., supra note 41, at 9.
56. Id. at 9. The original text of the Skinner opinion stated: "equitable principles require
that the ultimate liability for plaintiff's injuries be apportioned on the basis of the relative
degree of culpability of those whose conduct proximately caused them." The Skinner opinion
was modified on March 1, 1978 to read: ". . . on the basis of the relative degree to which the
defective product and the employer's conduct proximately caused them." This revision em-
phasizes that the basis for contribution between the strictly liable manufacturer and em-
ployer is comparative responsibility as opposed to fault. There is no requirement that a joint
tort be committed, see notes 2 and 30 supra.
57. This position is consistent with the previous law as to indemnity. See Miller v. De-
Witt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967). There the court held that a party whose passive
conduct rendered him liable to an injured employee, may seek indemnification from the
employer. However, in the context of contribution the court's reasoning indicates the rejection
of common liability as a prerequisite for contribution among joint tort-feasors. Usually, a
party is not liable to the original plaintiff. According to Skinner, even if a tort-feasor has
immunity from suit by original plaintiff, an action for contribution may be effective.Under
such an interpretation the immunity goes to the procedural ability to bring suit, rather than
substantive liability. How far the court will extend this principle is unclear. The argument
against the rejection of the common liability requirement is that it permits the original
plaintiff to do indirectly what he was unable to do directly. The defense of immunity is
circumvented by the plaintiff's recovery against another tort-feasor, followed by a suit for
contribution. See Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act (1955 Revised Act), 12
U.L.A. (1955 ed.) § 1b; Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 886A.2, Comment g. It is also worth
noting that the Committee Report, supra note 8, recommended against allowing an action
for contribution against an employer,
The majority of the Committee believes that the high rates currently imposed on
employers under workmen's compensation may be viewed as legislative intent to
limit employer liability to the rates indicated. It is therefore felt that contribution
should not be extended to these cases, and that where the fault of the employer does
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The court concluded, "The fact that the employee's action against
the employer is barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act would
not preclude the manufacturer's third-party action against the em-
ployer for indemnification and should not serve as a bar to its action
for contribution." 51 If the employer's conduct is a contributing cause
of an injury to his employee, then the employer may be found jointly
responsible and liable for contribution.
DISCUSSION
The critical arguments raised by the dissenting opinions filed in
Skinner serve as a useful framework for an initial evaluation of the
majority position. 9 The dissenting justices do not extol the virtues
of the rule against contribution, but contest the application of con-
tribution to the particular facts in Skinner. The result reached is
considered objectionable for two substantive reasons. 0 First, the
majority does not reconcile the conflict between the strict liability
theory and contribution. Secondly, allowing an action for contribu-
tion against an employer contravenes the scheme of Workmen's
Compensation Laws.
Contribution in Product Liability Cases
The Skinner decision is criticized for its implications with regard
to the policies underlying strict liability. The dissent argues that the
majority opinion totally ignores Illinois case law dealing with the
doctrine of strict liability and therefore impliedly overrules that
body of law.' This is not an entirely accurate characterization.
not justify the imposition of common law indemnity, the third party be prevented
from seeking recovery against the employer. Id. Recommendations, IV.B.2.d.
See also text accompanying notes 87 through 91 infra.
58. Slip op., supra note 41, at 9 (emphasis added).
59. Mr. Justice Dooley, Mr. Chief Justice Ward and Mr. Justice Underwood filed dissent-
ing opinions in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., No. 48757 Slip.
op. (Ill. Dec. 12, 1977). This dissent also applies to the companion cases decided with Skinner,
Stevens v. Silver Manufacturing, No. 48974 (Ill. Dec. 13, 1977) and Robinson v. International
Harvester Co. No. 49205 (Ill. Dec. 13, 1977). [Hereinafter cited as slip op. at (
dissenting)]. Initially, Mr. Justice Dooley was the only dissenter in the Skinner case. His
dissenting opinion addressed the majority opinion prior to its modification on March 1, 1978.
Mr. Justice Dooley's untimely death precluded any revision of his dissent. His dissent is
especially significant in that Mr. Justice Dooley has distinguished himself in products liabil-
ity litigation. See Dooley, Some Observations About Products Liability Litigation, 4 Loy. CHI.
L.J. 1 (1973). He has also authored a comprehensive treatise which covers the field of tort
law, Doouv, MODEmN Toirr LAw (1977). On denial of rehearing, Mr. Chief Justice Ward and
Mr. Justice Underwood joined the minority, which advocated the dismissal of the third-party
complaint, and filed their separate dissenting opinions.
60. Mr. Justice Underwood raises a procedural objection against the court's adoption of
contribution based on Maki v. Frelk, see note 111 infra. See also note 44 supra.
61. Slip op., supra note 59, at 14 (Dooley, J. dissenting). See cases collected in notes 37
and 38 supra.
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Skinner distinguishes the policy considerations which govern the
plaintiffs recovery from those that dictate approtionment in third-
party practice. Certainly, Skinner permits a manufacturer to obtain
contribution from a party more proximate to the injured party in
the chain of distribution,"2 but the impact on the policies of strict
liability, as articulated in past case law, is not as significant as the
dissent maintains.
The minority position emphasizes that strict liability is not predi-
cated on negligent conduct, but the character of the product. 3 The
inference to be drawn, then, is that strict liability imposes a non-
delegable duty to produce a safe product." Assuredly, the prophy-
lactic effect of strict liability on manufacturers is an important
consideration within products liability, but there is no evidence
which indicates that the "downstream" action 5 permitted in
Skinner frustrates this prohibitive effect."
Moreover the minority analysis is incomplete when considered in
the context of third-party actions for contribution or indemnity. 7
The approach stresses that concepts of fault and duty are irrelevant
under the doctrine of strict liability; yet such concepts determine
the rights of third-parties in loss allocation. 6 The minority position
leaves the manufacturer without recourse to third-party actions for
the distribution of losses arising out of common liability. Strict
liability does not dictate this result.
Manufacturers and distributors are held strictly liable for harm
caused by their products because liability based on negligence does
not adequately protect consumers from risks of bodily harm caused
by modern production and marketing systems." Strict liability is
often characterized as liability without negligence, but perhaps it is
more appropriately termed liability based on policy considerations.
The basic thrust of this policy is the protection of the injured plain-
tiff from the loss caused by a defective product." Thus, the majority
62. See note 54 supra.
63. Slip op., supra note 59, 14, 16 (Dooley J. dissenting), citing Bachner v. Pearson, 479
P.2d 319, 329 (Alaska 1970); Bollmeier v. Ford Motor Co., 130 Ill. App. 2d 844, 851, 265
N.E.2d 212, 217 (1970). See also DooLEY, 1 MODERN Toirr LAW § 26.13 (1977).
64. Slip op., supra note 59, 14, 18 (Dooley, J. dissenting), citing Rios v. Niagra Machine
& Tool Works, 49 Ill. 2d 79, 85, 319 N.E.2d 232, 235 (1974); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,
61 Cal. 2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964).
65. See note 54 supra.
66. In fact the action allowed in Skinner may reinforce employee safety vis a vis products
at work, see note 76 infra.
67. See Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Product
Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REv. 723 (1974).
68. Id.
69. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. Rav. 791 (1966).
70. Id. The idea behind making the manufacturer liable is that he is in a better position
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correctly holds that after this policy goal is satisfied, normal equita-
ble principles may apply to govern distribution of losses.7'
Skinner provides manufacturers with recourse to third-party ac-
tions for the allocation of losses on the basis of relative responsibil-
ity.7" The majority opinion labels the third-party action against the
employer in a peculiar fashion. Although the manufacturer asked
for contribution on the ground that it was not solely responsible for
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the court concluded that
the third-party complaint, . . . pleaded in terms of negligence,
alleges misuse of the product and assumption of risk on the part
of the employer and states a cause of action for contribution based
on the relative degree to which the defective product and the em-
ployer's misuse of the product or its assumption of the risk contrib-
uted to cause plaintiffs injuries.73
In this context, these terms indicate that if an employer uses a
machine which is poorly maintained or in a state of disrepair, and
as a result, his employee is injured, the employer has assumed the
risk of its use on the premises. Thus, while the injured employee is
not barred from recovery against the manufacturer, this "misuse"
of the product serves as a basis for contribution from the employer-
purchaser.
Mr. Justice Dooley criticizes the use of these concepts by the
court:
[Assumption of risk] cannot be the basis of a third-party action,
[aind the majority fails to show how it could be employed in this
context. So also, misuse by [a third-party] is erroneously termed
a defense. But it is part . . . of plaintiff's action in strict liability
. . . to plead and prove that the product was being used for a
reasonably foreseeable purpose."
The use of these terms as a basis for a third-party action is a clear
departure from past practice. The majority opinion does not explain
why it chose to discuss the third-party complaint in these terms. If
the cause of action seeks apportionment of losses to reflect relative
responsibility, it should be inferred that the action is essentially
based on equitable principles. Thus, the manufacturer should not
be required to bear the burden of losses for which another party is
to assume the loss and spread the cost than the injured party.
71. See text accompanying notes 52 through 54 supra.
72. The rule of apportionment applied in Skinner is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 82 through 86 infra.
73. Slip op. supra note 41, at 9.
74. Slip op. supra note 59, at 14-15 (Dooley, J. dissenting).
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responsible. The labels "misuse" or "assumption of risk" add noth-
ing to the substantive cause of action of contribution.
Perhaps the court used the familiar terminology to remove the
necessity of articulating the definition of contribution more exactly.
Alternatively the terms may establish the basis for qualitative com-
parison in assessing the relative roles of the employer and manufac-
turer in causing plaintiff's injuries. Regardless of how the court
chooses to categorize the employer's liability, it must be contrasted
with the strict liability of the manufacturer. Under contribution, an
equitable apportionment based on relative responsibility is possible
when the trier of fact can weigh the manufacturer's liability against
the employer's conduct on policy considerations.75 It is submitted
that the "misuse," (i.e. disrepair or poor maintenance of the prod-
uct), constitutes those policy considerations, and serves as the basis
for a standard of comparison for contribution.
Contribution and Workmen's Compensation
The second substantive objection raised by the dissents in
Skinner concerns the application of contribution to an employer in
apparent circumvention of workmen's compensation laws. Skinner
allows a manufacturer to obtain contribution from plaintiff's em-
ployer. Although the manufacturer advocated specific policy
grounds for contribution in strict liability cases where an employee
is injured by "defective" machinery,7" the majority opinion does not
use these policy factors to justify the avoidance of workmen's com-
pensation laws. The majority concludes the result in Skinner was
consistent with allowing actions for indemnity against an employer
under the active-passive doctrine." However, in drawing this anal-
ogy the court failed to recognize the distinction between the scope
of relief under each of these alternatives. The active-passive doc-
trine permits relief only when there is a gross disparity in the negli-
gence of the parties. Thus, an employer is subject to liability inde-
pendent of workmen's compensation only if his culpability is sub-
75. Committee Report, supra note 8, Recommendations of the Committee IV. B. 2(a).
76. Essentially the manufacturer contended that: (1) Injuries to employees caused by
defective products frequently involve employer negligence; (2) The risk of injury created by
the manufacturer's product is relatively insignificant when compared to the risk of injury
caused by employer's negligence in maintenance. (3) An employer can indulge in negligent
conduct without suffering any loss where an unreasonably dangerous product is found to be
a contributing or causative factor in any injuries to his employees; and (4) The employer
has no financial incentive to maintain his tools and machinery in a safe condition for his em-
ployees. The manufacturer concluded that these results are against public policy because
they undermine employee safety. Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 50-53.
77. Slip op., supra note 41, at 9.
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stantially greater. In contrast, contribution exposes employers to
liability in many instances where fault being relatively equal the
active-passive doctrine would be inapplicable." In spite of the im-
portance of this distinction the majority does not consider the issue.
Subsequent to Skinner an employer will be subject to potential
liability in all products liability work-related situations." Skinner
will drastically modify the method of distributing losses in employee
injury cases. Whether this modification will undermine the work-
men's compensation laws remains to be determined. There are
grounds which support the conclusion that the statutory liability
should be exclusive. First, employers waive many rights in consider-
ation of limited liability under workmen's compensation. Second,
the high compensation rates imposed on employers under work-
men's compensation signify the legislative intent to limit liability
to the rates prescribed. 0 It is clear that if an employer's liability
consistently exceeds the rate of liability under workmen's compen-
sation, the viability of the statutory compensation scheme will be
jeopardized. In order to preserve the integrity of the workmen's
compensation scheme, procedural steps may be necessary to insure
that an employer's liability is limited to the statutory rate.8"
THE IMPLICATIONS OF Skinner AND CONTRIBUTION
Rule of Apportionment
Although questions concerning the adoption of contribution in
Illinois are left unanswered by Skinner,"2 the principle applied by
the court in resolving the case is significant. When the court appor-
tioned the losses on the basis of relative responsibility, it established
the fundamental principle that will serve as a guide for the develop-
ment of contribution. If the principles in Skinner are applied consis-
tently, courts will gradually implement a liberal policy of apportion-
ment of losses among tort-feasors.
The rule of relative responsibility adopted in Skinner is far supe-
78. See notes 18 and 57 supra.
79. Work-related injuries constitute a class of cases estimated to encompass 85% of all
product liability suits. See Insurance Co. of North America Products Liability: Some Profes-
sional Considerations, Booklet HH-8306-3 (1976) quoted in slip op., supra note 59, at 14, 21-
22 (Dooley, J. dissenting).
80. See note 57 supra.
81. Pennsylvania allows contribution against an employer, but limits an employer's liabil-
ity to rates under workmen's compensation laws. See O'Connor v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 150
F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959); Maio v.
Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 405 (1940); It is perhaps significant that in Illinois, an employee's
workmen's compensation recovery is not admissible as evidence in the employee's action
against a third party, Miller v. DeWitt 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
82. See text accompanying note 108.
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rior to a pro-rata division of losses.13 Pro-rata recovery involves the
division of losses equally among joint tort-feasors," but ignores the
disproportionate fault or causal negligence of the parties. Although
approtionment of losses pro-rata is simple, it is inconsistent with the
general principle that fault should govern the extent of liability. In
addition, the concept of joint tort-feasor, with its inherent defini-
tional problems, retains importance in a pro-rata distribution
scheme because once a defendant is considered liable as a joint tort-
feasor he is responsible for a pro-rata share of the losses. In relative
responsible apportionment, however, the concept is immaterial as
the determinative factor is the extent to which a tort-feasor's con-
duct contributes to plaintiff's injury. Usually under a relative fault
approach the trier of fact will determine on a percentage basis the
degree of responsibility in causing a plaintiff's injuries, and loss will
then be distributed in proportion to the allocable fault. 5 The deci-
sion to apply the rule of relative fault emphasizes the essential
fairness of dividing damages on the basis of responsibility as op-
posed to artificial shares. Moreover the application of these princi-
ples in Skinner to a strictly liable tort-feasor signifies that the ulti-
mate standard for assessing fault is causative responsibility."
Common Liability
The majority rule is that common liability is a prerequisite to
contribution,87 and that a right of contribution does not accrue
83. See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 978 (1975). Admittedly pro rata apportionment is the most widely accepted method
because its mechanics are simple and expedient. Herein the relative fault approach is consid-
ered superior because apportionment of losses reflect responsibility.
84. The total damages are divided by the number of joint tort-feasors held liable. See
Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort-feasors Act, (1955 version) 12 U.L.A. § 2 (1975 ed.).
Relative fault the other traditional method of apportioning damages involves contribution in
proportion to responsibility. The Committee Report, supra note 10, recommended that liabil-
ity be apportioned on the basis of relative fault. The defendant manufacturer in Skinner also
argued that if contribution was adopted in Illinois it should be on the basis of relative fault,
Brief for Appellant, supra note 22, at 45-57. It is worth noting that although the rule of relative
fault is considered the better rule of apportionment, note 83 supra, the choice may have little
practical significance where tort-feasors are equally responsible. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.
2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); PROSSER, LAW OF TorS § 52 (4th ed. 1971).
85. The majority opinion does not articulate the exact mechanics of the rule of apportion-
ment, but percentage comparison is normally employed. See Schwartz, Comparative
Negligence (1974).
86. While there is no requirement that a joint tort be committed, see note 2 supra, the
causative responsibility of each party must sound in tort. There is no indication that the
principles of contribution in Skinner apply to individuals who are not tort-feasors. This may
be another reason for the court's speaking in terms of "misuse" or "assumption of risk". New
York does not limit its contribution statute to liability in tort. N. Y. Civ. Prac. 1401 § 1 (1974).
See also Committee Report, supra note 8, Legislation Proposed V.
87. PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 6, § 4.01.
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against a defendant unless he is a tort-feasor originally liable to
plaintiff. According to this interpretation contribution is derivative
of plaintiff's cause of action. u Consequently if, as a matter of law,
the injured party has no cause of action against a tort-feasor, there
is no basis for contribution against that tort-feasor for his concurring
negligence . 9 Skinner rejects the prerequisite of common liability for
an action of contribution, and implicitly recognizes that it is a new
right of action independent of the original plaintiff's claim. Skinner
allows a manufacturer to recover against the employer even though
the injured party could not raise a claim directly against the latter
because of workmen's compensation laws. While this result supports
the inference that immunity from suit by the original plaintiff is
only a procedural formality and does not affect substantive liability
in third-party suits, it is unlikely that Skinner signals a trend to-
ward the abandonment of all distinctions which prevent proportion-
ate fault from governing the extent of liability. 0 Moreover it is un-
clear whether the court will extend its rejection of common liability
beyond the facts of Skinner.9
Contribution and Indemnity
The recognition of contribution in Illinois should curtail the crea-
tive expansion of indemnity, and eliminate the need to provide
recovery through implied indemnity under the active-passive negli-
gence doctrine. 2 To the extent that an indemnitor bears conse-
quences brought about by the action or inaction of an indemnitee,
the operation of the active-passive doctrine is contradictory to the
ideal that fault should govern the scope of liability. 3 The rule of
apportionment in Skinner will permit a more equitable distribution
of damages because the loss imposed will truly reflect the degree of
88. See Slip op., supra note 59, at 19 (Dooley, J. dissenting).
89. PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 6, § 1.03[3].
90. See note 49 supra.
91. For example the court's reasoning could equally apply to family immunity. Thus, a
spouse could be impleaded for contribution by the principal defendant even though inter-
spousal immunity bars plaintiff from suing the third-party defendant, spouse, in a direct
action. This view indicates contribution is not a recovery for the tort, but the enforcement of
an equitable duty to share liability for the wrong done. See PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 6, §
4.05.
92. Committee Report, supra note 8, Recommendations of the Committee, IV. B.I. The
Committee concluded a more restrictive rule of indemnity necessarily follows from the adop-
tion of contribution. See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams Machine & Tool Co. 62
Ill.2d 77, 84, 338 N.E.2d 857, 861 (1975). The active-passive doctrine was created as a "means
to do justice within the law" when the rule against contribution was in effect, see note 13
supra.
93. See notes 18 through 21 and accompanying text supra.
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responsibility." However, the adoption of contribution should not
imply the elimination of the action for indemnity as it existed at
common law.9 To the contrary, where such a right to indemnity
exists, that right should control and contribution should not be
permitted." Thus, while Skinner should abolish recovery through
implied indemnity, the case should not be interpreted as modifying
common law indemnity.9
7
Contribution Among Intentional Tort-feasors
Although the majority opinion concludes that there is no valid
reason for the continued existence of the no-contribution rule,9 8
Skinner may suggest that the rule against contribution among in-
tentional tort-feasors remains in effect.9 Skinner predicates the
manufacturer's recovery in contribution on a finding that the duty
imposed in strict liability is not more stringent than in cases involv-
ing negligence. 00 Arguably the policy considerations may be quite
different when discussing contribution among intentional tort-
feasors. The duty breached in an intentional tort is construed as
more stringent than that in negligence. Traditionally the inten-
tional tort-feasor is held liable for all the consequences of his action
apart from any question of foreseeability.'01 On this basis some au-
thorities still advocate the application of the rule against contribu-
94. See Committee Report, supra note 8, Recommendations of the Committee IV. B. 1
and 2. For example, while indemnity is now permitted under the Structural Work Act in favor
of the "lesser delingquent party", contribution will permit a more equitable apportionment.
Id. at 2(b).
95. For a discussion of the notion of contract indemnity vis a vis the rule against contribu-
tion, see Furnish, Distributing Tort Liability: Contribution and Indemnity in Iowa, 52 IowA
L. REV. 31 (1966). See also Committee Report, supra note 8, Recommendations of the Com-
mittee IV.B.1.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886 A. 3 (1970), "Where one tortfeasor has a right
of indemnity against another neither of them has a right of contribution against the other."
97. Mr. Justice Dooley submits the apparent effect of Skinner "is to abolish indemnity.
'Total indemnification' (Robinson), 'partial indemnification' (Skinner and Stevens) and con-
tribution are all treated interchangeably". Slip op., supra note 59, at 24 (Dooley, J. dissent-
ing) [Mr. Justice Dooley refers to the companion cases decided with Skinner, see note 11
supra]. While the Skinner "trio" may perpetuate considerable confusion over the terms
"indemnity" and "contribution", see Prosser, lAw OF TORTS § 51 (4th ed. 1971), the majority
does not address question of how contribution will effect recovery through indemnification.
98. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
99. The rule against contribution in its original formulation only barred contribution
among joint tort-feasors, see note 1 supra. Moreover while the rule against contribution
among unintentional tort-feasors may have questionable historical origins, the rule against
contribution among intentional tort-feasors is quite another matter. See note 50 supra.
100. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
101. The classic illustration of this principle is the situation where an "egg shell headed"
plaintiff is injured by an act that constitutes intentional battery. The intentional tort-feasor
is responsible for the consequences of his action whether foreseeable or not.
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tion when the tort was one of intentional misconduct or of concerted
action. "2 Notwithstanding these factors it has been argued that the
best rule takes a uniform approach towards all torts, leaving it to
the trier of fact to weigh relative culpability. 0 3 The majority rule
adopts the approach which allows contribution between intentional
tort-feasors.' 4 Since Skinner does not explicitly distinguish the rule
against contribution as it is applied to unintentional and intentional
tort-feasors, the question of which position the court has adopted
remains somewhat speculative.10
THE AFTERMATH OF SKINNER
Originally the Skinner opinion lacked guidelines for the imple-
mentation of the new principle it adopted. Mr Justice Dooley advo-
cated that the decision be given prospective application to prevent
injustices and hardships due to reliance on the over-ruled princi-
ples. 06 On a denial of rehearing the court filed a supplemental opin-
ion that modified its decision in Skinner to apply, "prospectively to
causes of action arising out of occurrences on or after March 1,
1978."107 While this alteration resolved the immediate difficulties
presented by Skinner, questions concerning the adoption of contri-
bution in Illinois remain unanswered.
Skinner fails to indicate the method for practically dividing losses
between tort-feasors. 0 8 To an extent Skinner leaves most basic ques-
102. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TowrvasoRs AcT § 1 (c) (1955 version), "There
is no right of contribution in favor of any tort-feasor who has intentionally . . .caused or
contributed to the injury or wrongful death."; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A. "(3)
There is no right of contribution in favor of any tort-feasor who has intentionally. . .caused
the harm." Accord, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennes-
see, Virginia. PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 6 § 1.03 (2), p. 661 n. 4.
103. See Committee Report, supra note 8, Recommendations of the Committee,
IV.B.2(e).
104. See PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 6, § 1.03 (2), p. 663.
105. Mr. Chief Justice Ward notes that the majority opinion is equivocal on this point,
and concludes "the rule denying contribution [with respect to intentional tort-feasors]
should be preserved. I would state that it is being retained." Slip op., supra note 59, at 11
(Ward, C.J. dissenting).
106. See slip op., supra note 59, at 26 (Dooley, J. dissenting). The doctrine which supports
this result is commonly referred to as the "Sunburst" rule. See Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). See also Schaefer, The Control of
"Sunbursts", Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 631 (1967). Note that
a Petition for Certiorari was filed on this prospective application, 77-1494: Skinner v. Reed-
Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., 4/19/78.
107. Slip op., supra note 41, at 9.
108. Mr. Chief Justice Ward concluded, "Although the majority opinion does not elabo-
rate on its meaning, [the] standard suggests some quantitative comparison of fault, such as
60 percent to 40 prcent, instead of the qualitative comparison of active and passive made
indemnity cases." Slip op., supra note 59, at 10 (Ward, J. dissenting). He also notes that the
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tions of mechanics open to speculation. In this respect the court
announces a new doctrine without clarifying how its new teaching
shall be put into practice.'0 In the context of modern tort litigation
a reviewing court should consider immediate procedural problems
to facilitate the operation of the rule in the trial courts." 0
Aside from the practical concerns left unanswered by Skinner,
there are many other companion procedural problems presented by
the adoption of contribution. A reviewing court can not be expected
to resolve all these matters in a single pronouncement.' Only a
legislative forum presents the opportunity to view an area as a
whole, and at one time propose answers to those problems which
may be foreseen. "2 For this reason the legislature is the more appro-
piate forum for the disposition of these questions. Legislation should
consider the three basic contexts within which contribution is exer-
cised:
(1) The injured party and all tortfeasors, including impleaded
parties, are before the court as active litigants and judgment is
rendered establishing liability of all tortfeasors to the injured
party;
(2) The injured party brings an action against one tortfeasor who
then brings a separate action for contribution against the other
concurrent tortfeasor upon the judgment rendered against him;
and
(3) The injured party settles with one tortfeasor who then brings
an independent action for contribution against another tortfea-
sor. "3
The legislation should also establish: the effect of a settlement by a
tort-feasor;"' the effect of a release or covenant not to sue;"5 the
majority has not demonstrated that such a quantitative test will prove more manageable than
the active-passive test. See note 19 supra.
109. Mr. Justice Dooley argues that the majority has an obligation to spell out in detail
how its new rule will be put into practice, slip op., supra note 59, at 26 (Dooley, J. dissenting).
See Hoffman v. Jones 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804,
532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). See also SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGUGENCE,§ 21.7
(1974).
110. See Keeton, Creative Continuity In The Law Of Torts, 75 HARV. L. Rsv. 463 484-86
(1962).
111. Mr. Justice Underwood concludes that Skinner is the obvious forerunner of other
equally substantial innovations in the tort law of Illinois, and the legislature is far preferable
for acting upon all of the areas in which this new law will require change, slip op., supra note
59, at 13 (Underwood, J. dissenting).
112. See Committee Report, supra note 15, Recommendations of the Committee IV A3.
113. PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 6, § 1.03 at 688-89.
114. See PERSONA INJURY, supra note 6, § 1.04.
115. See PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 6, § 1.05.
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statute of limitations applicable to a right of contribution;"' and the
successful procedural defenses against an action for contribution."7
CONCLUSION
An eventual consequence of Skinner on third-party practice in
Illinois will be an increase in contribution claims filed by manufac-
turers against employers in work-related injury cases. Although the
adverse impact on employers may be exaggerated, it is clear that if
the purpose of workmen's compensation laws is frustrated, the legis-
lature or courts will have to take steps to modify the method of
apportioning losses in such cases. While Skinner abolished the rule
against contribution, the ultimate significance of the decision might
well be to prompt the legislature to address the problems of contri-
bution in Illinois. A comprehensive statutory scheme of contribution
would reduce the uncertainties produced by Skinner and avoid the
proliferation of needless litigation. Until legislative action is taken,
however, the courts must gradually implement a framework for dis-
tributing losses arising out of common responsibility. The principles
ennunciated in Skinner should serve as the basis for either judicial
or legislative action.
TIMOTHY J. RIVELLI
116. See PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 6, § 4.08.
117. See PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 6, § 4.01.
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